

AIR

SECRET

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JUN 15 1953

Chief, SE

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

INFO: COM, BOMB, PULL, CADRAIN

CALL/Operational

Chief Comments on recent East Zone Developments

1. Grotz appears quite worried about the extent of Soviet cold war capabilities to bring about a piecemeal relaxation of East-West tension by a gradual though spectacular dropping of existing restrictions. This, Grotz fears, may conceivably result in a discreditation of resistance leaders who have been indoctrinating into the East Zone populace a belief that the USSR is determined to establish a Bolshevik type terror regime and ultimately annex the East Zone to the Soviet Union. Grotz is convinced that the call addressed to East Zone refugees to return to the USSR will be heeded by many farmers who are now leading a life of suffering and indignity in West Germany. He anticipates a slump in the will to resist and a concomitant loss of face of resistance organizations - provided the Russians play the game consistently and do not at the last moment come to our aid by making the one crucial mistake which during previous periods of apparent reasonableness was wont to tip off the West as to the ingrained insincerity of Soviet policy. Grotz did not seem to think that the stark facts of material Soviet concessions over the long run be neutralized by a purely dogmatic harping on the difference between strategy and tactics.

2. Another contingency which Grotz appears to be anticipating with considerable concern is that the Soviets may decide to undo the enforced SPD/KPD merger and instruct Grotz to reactivate the old KPD in Eastern Germany. The legal side would of course question the legitimacy of such a move, but unless strongly backed by the Allies - might be controlled to reconcile itself to the existence of a de facto KPD run by Soviet picked functionaries, in effect a neo-communist front organization (a la WGBI). Grotz intimated that the KPD had laid its plans to deal effectively with such a move, but did not conceal from me the fact that this may become a crucial contest. I expressed as my own personal view that the KPD should in this resort to propaganda action rather than wait for the Soviets to make the first move. Grotz hinted that the creation of an anti-party organization for the East Zone was already in existence.

15 June 1953

objt
distribution:

COM

BOMB: 1 - PULL

CADRAIN (Berlin) 1 - BOMB

*Orig to RI
1c destroyed*

COPY

*Orig copy
to RF on
2 July Tucker
comment: "Pure speculation
no evidence is adduced."
Para. 1 partly obsolete" 11354*

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3. I shall continue to elicit CAULAT's views on Eastern developments, but would suggest that the State Department actively concern itself with an intensive study of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany especially from the viewpoint of anticipating Soviet moves designed to lay the foundations for a future coup d'etat. Having gone thru the object lessons of post-war Czechoslovakia et. al and having studied and recognized the effective use made by the Soviets of the so-called "dual power" device, it should be possible at this stage to arrive at a basic understanding between the United States and the Federal Republic on how to counter possible Soviet moves which under the guise of a full-fledged return to democratic procedure and institutions would strive to leave behind nuclei of covert communist control. It need not be emphasized in this context that the U.S.S.R. would possibly also try to convert the remnants of the bourgeois parties into such nuclei and that the problems involved are therefore of an across-the-board nature.

Approved by:

326 - 11584